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Riassunto
I comportamenti psicopatici aggressivi possiedono un forte impatto sociale e la loro distruttività può avere conseguenze scon-
volgenti.  In tutto il corso della storia ed ancora oggi, la psicopatia è sempre stata oggetto di indagini  di natura descrittiva,
psicodinamica, genetica e biologica.  Questo articolo affronta la questione della libertà decisionale degli psicopatici ovvero
se questi non possono ritenersi pienamente responsabili dei comportamenti delittuosi tenuti. L’Autore, dopo aver presentato
una breve review del concetto di psicopatia, dell'aggressività ad essa correlata e delle relative teorie psicoanalitiche, procede
ad una disamina delle teorie filosofiche sulla libera volontà e sul determinismo.  Analizza, poi, i recenti risultati delle neuroi-
maging cerebrali negli psicopatici.  Riserva, inoltre, una considerazione speciale alla teoria di Libet sulla libera volontà. Esa-
mina, infine, la responsabilità personale dello psicopatico rispetto ad una condotta delittuosa, alla luce dei concetti di libera
volontà e  determinismo.
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Abstract
Psychopathic aggressive behavior is extremely antisocial and its destructiveness can be appalling. Throughout the past and
still at present, psychopathy has been the topic of descriptive, psychodynamic, genetic and biological investigations. This
article addresses the question of whether psychopaths are free in their decisional capacity or whether their criminal acts are
subjected to determinism. A brief review of the history of psychopathy, psychopathic aggressivity, and pertinent psychoanalytic
views are presented, along with philosophical theories of free will and determinism. Recent findings of brain neuroimaging
of psychopaths are discussed. Special regard is given to Libet’s theory of free will. The criminal responsibility of psychopaths
is considered in view of free will and determinism.
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1. History of Psychopathy
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV-TR (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2000) includes under the heading An-
tisocial Personality Disorder some of the basic
characteristics of the psychopathic personality. However, the
consensus among mental health professionals is that a dis-
tinction should be made between the two. The majority of
persons with an Antisocial Personality Disorder can be
viewed as reactors to social stresses, while the psychopaths
are ‘real’ actors, planning and initiating an antisocial action.
The characteristics of the latter, as reported by Hare (1993),
seem to retrace Cleckley’s (1955) description of psy-
chopaths as self-centered, callous and remorseless persons,
profoundly lacking in empathy, and with an inability to
form warm relationships with others, persons who function
without the restraint of a conscience. The recidivism of
criminal psychopaths is well known and their treatability is
questionable.
Historically, the concept of psychopathy dates back to
the time of Pinel (1801/1962) and Lombroso (1889) – to
Pinel with his emphasis on the lack of morals in the psy-
chopath and to Lombroso with his characterization of the
psychopath as a born criminal. Many scholars have stressed
the etiology of psychopathy, presenting it variously as con-
genital, biological, personal or environmental. Pinel consid-
ered psychopaths to be mentally ill, suffering from a manie
sans delire and in need of moral treatment; Rush (1812) pro-
posed organic causes for psychopathy, which he considered
a disease; and Prichard (1835) described it as a disorder of
a person’s feelings and attitudes, without the involvement
of higher mental functions but with a predisposition to be-
have as a morally insane person without the human capacity
for empathy. Koch (1891) coined the term psychopathic
inferior and he considered psychopathy to be a hereditary
disease, with emotional and moral aberrations and abnormal
behaviors. Maudsley (1896) thought psychopaths to be suf-
fering from moral imbecility due to a cerebral dysfunction;
von Krafft-Ebing (1922) viewed them as “savages,” and be-
lieved that they were in need of isolation and treatment for
their own sake and that of society; and Kraepelin (1915)
described them as manipulators and charming liars, impul-
sive and remorseless (Arrigo & Shipley, 2001). 
Cleckley (1955), in his seminal work, The Mask of San-
ity, described psychopaths as grandiose, arrogant, callous, su-
perficial and manipulative. He reported their conduct to
vary in severity “from a mild or borderline degree up
through a great degree of disability” (p. 279) and he believed
the disability to be genuine. He also pointed out their re-
cidivistic criminal tendencies and their frequent outward
appearance of normality. In the psychopaths we are indeed
confronted, as Cleckley wrote, with a mask of sanity, and “all
the outward features of this mask are intact….The thought
processes retain their normal aspect under psychiatric in-
vestigation and in technical tests…[an example of] la folie
lucid” (p. 423). Their expressions, tone of voice, and general
demeanor seem normal, but they fail “altogether when
[they are] put into the practice of actual living” (p. 424). The
personal and social failures of psychopaths are so pervasive
that they can only be explained, as Cleckley wrote, by their
being madmen or by their being incapable of grasping the
meaning of their thoughts or feelings. The concept of their
functioning, said Cleckley, “postulates a selective defect…
which prevents important components of normal experi-
ence from being integrated into the whole human reaction,
particularly an elimination or attenuation of those strong
affective components that ordinarily arise in major personal
and social issues” (p. 428). The distorted affectivity of psy-
chopaths, their tragic persistence in antisocial behavior and
their inability to learn from mistakes is akin to a profound
childish immaturity, which causes them to move, without
reflection, from thought to action, without appraising and
discerning what type of decision they should make and act
upon. 
The emotions of psychopaths can be described as
pseudo-emotions. They use a pantomime of feelings. They
are full of rationalizations, their judgment is poor, and their
sense of value is almost inexistent. Their outward behavior
seems to be the result of a deeply distorted inner personality,
similar to that of the schizophrenic, at times largely con-
cealed by apparently good reasoning and their ability to live
their lives in a quasi-sane manner (Palermo, 2004). 
Macdonald (1961) described psychopaths as lacking
empathy, impulsive and intolerant of frustration. They are
usually of average or above average intelligence, have an ap-
parent lack of guilt and do not learn from experience.
Alexander and Ross (1952) believed that at the basis of psy-
chopaths’ symptomatic self-destructive behavior is the pres-
ence of unconscious neurotic conflicts, even of an
incestuous or patricidal nature. The psychopath may project
his unacceptable aggressive feelings outwardly and for him
the world suddenly becomes a hostile place in which to live
and at times he acts out against it. Halleck (1967) posited
that the psychopath violates the law “in his efforts to suit
the world to his own needs” (p. 109). The crimes could be
a way to control a fear of psychological disintegration. 
Arieti (1967) attributed the impulsiveness of psy-
chopaths and their desire for immediate gratification to an
attempt to overcome unbearable inner tension due to short-
circuited anxiety. They are “unable to change, repress, post-
pone or neutralize [their] need for hostility,” he stated (p.
248), and their criminal acting out may be in the form of
murder, rape, seduction in men, or promiscuity and prosti-
tution in women. More important and relevant to this dis-
cussion, however, is Arieti’s reflection on the paranoid
psychopath. Psychopathic traits or behavior “generally pre-
24 Rassegna Italiana di Criminologia - 4/2011 Articoli
ceded a definite paranoiac symptomatology, or, in some
cases, periods of acting out with no freely expressed delu-
sions alternating with obvious delusional periods” (p. 248). 
Psychopaths have a reduced sensitivity or no response
to displays of distress in others, are distractible, and have a
desire for immediate gratification, without a balance be-
tween immediate and long-term gratification and have lin-
guistic deficits (Schneider and Nussbaum, 2007). Already
in 1993, Robert Hare reported that linguistically the psy-
chopath’s speech is syntactically and semantically disor-
dered, with disconnected components which are,
nevertheless, masked by a superficially-grammatical orderly
structure.
In summary, psychopaths are self-indulgent and inter-
personally intrusive (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976). When
acting out criminally, they are remorseless and callous. Their
transgressions of societal rules bring harm to others and
show their inability to process moral issues in a mature way.
They are “oblivious and insensitive to affective moral va-
lences and therefore the prospect of being governed by
those aspects of life is not even a possibility” (Schneider and
Nussbaum (2007, p. 180). They seem to be fixed at a pre-
conventional level of moral development (Kohlberg, 1984;
Piaget, (1932/1965). Psychological and neurological studies
support the clinical findings that psychopaths show dimin-
ished emotional responsiveness to the suffering of the peo-
ple they victimize. They seem to be unable to understand
their victim’s fear as reflected in their facial expression (the-
ory of mind), and that worsens their aggressive violence
(Blair, 2001). They show a diminished appreciation of moral
codes. They are extremely impulsive and act without re-
flecting on the consequences of their behavior. This raises
the question of whether they are morally or legally respon-
sible for their actions.
At times psychopaths show feature of a Borderline Per-
sonality Disorder. In those cases their symptomatology is
even more complex. They may go through sudden mood
changes, such as anger, depression, anhedonia, sense of fu-
tility, loneliness and isolation. They resort to primitive de-
fense mechanisms, such as ambivalence, projective
identification, feelings of omnipotence, denial, idealization
and devaluation. Their behavior is more marginal, transient
and ego-dystonic, and their interpersonal relationships ap-
pear to be good only on the surface. At times they may suf-
fer from transitory and fleeting hallucinations or delusions.
They even seem unable to control their impulses because
of sudden psychotic thinking due to internal and external
stress. In such cases they fall into Otto Kernberg’s (1992)
classification of psychotic personality organization. 
2. Psychopathic Aggression
Research has found a strong relationship between psy-
chopathy and aggressive behavior in offenders throughout
their criminal careers. Hare and Jutai (1983) supported the
propensity for violent aggression by psychopathic offenders
who, they found, committed crimes twice as often as non-
psychopaths. Similar percentages were found by Porter,
Birt, and Boer in another later study (2001). 
In general, aggression driven by anger and hostility can
be viewed as a progressive manifestation of the displeasure
felt in and about life and people by a person with a shaky
emotional equilibrium. It can be distinguished as primary
aggression and reactive aggression. Blackburn (1998) de-
scribed aggressive psychopathic behavior as primary – that
of the classical psychopath, hostile and destructive in char-
acter, with many constitutional deficits, or secondary – as
reactive to psychosocial factors, generally frustrating life ex-
periences. Aggression also can be subdivided into premed-
itated aggression, impulsive aggression and aggression
caused by medical illnesses (Glenn & Raine, 2009). The ag-
gression of psychopaths has in itself a varied degree of im-
pulsivity. 
Impulsivity may be viewed as a complex act by a person
“without the ability to consider the consequences to [him-
self] or others....a failure of a normal process by which, over
about one-third of a second, a potential behavior is screened
before it enters conscious awareness” (Swann, 2003, p. 26).
Even though psychopaths seem to function normally, their
quick decision making, lacking reflection before acting,
makes their decisional capacity defective. To this effect Wil-
son and Herrnstein (1985) stated: “Impulsiveness can be
thought of as either the cause or the effect of the poor con-
ditionability of the psychopath” (p. 204). They show a lack
of self criticism and “[w]ithout the internal monologue,
time horizons shrink; behavior becomes more tied to its
immediate consequences” (p. 205). Strong unsublimated
impulses are disruptive, and self-control is essential for a per-
son in order to avoid giving vent to unbridled impulsivity. 
From a philosophical point of view, impulses were
viewed by Friedrich Nietzsche (1998) as important in a
person’s behavior. He wrote that “a man without impulses
could not do the good or create the beautiful any more
than a castrated man could beget children” (in Kaufmann,
1974, p. 224). Nevertheless, impulses need control, and he
viewed the man who is able to master his passions as pow-
erful – a superman (übermann) – able to organize his self
and, in so doing, give style to his character. As Kaufmann
wrote (1974), Nietzsche believed that the man who imposes
restraints on himself is not only “a ‘rational’ animal, but also
a ‘moral’ animal” (1974, p. 213). The two may coexist. On
the other hand, he viewed the man who strives for power
over others through bullying and criminal activity as a weak
person, deeply frustrated. Nietzsche believed firmly that
true existence is not a passive accident but is a personal,
progressive achievement toward bettering oneself, attempt-
ing to achieve those higher models of behavior one should
aim for in order to become one’s true self: “…You shall be-
come who you are” [Du sollst der werden, der du bist]” (Kauff-
man, 1974, p. 159). He well portrayed the criminal’s restless,
morally unhealthy personality when he wrote, “What is this
man? He’s a heap of diseases, which through his spirit, reach
out into the world: there they want to catch their prey...a
ball of wild snakes, which rarely enjoy rest from each other:
so they go forth singly and seek prey in the world” (Niet-
zsche, 1978, p. 39). His stark description is typical of the
criminal psychopath. 
Baruk, the French psychiatrist, viewed the total lack of
moral values, present in the psychopathic offenders, as “one
of the worst calamities that can affect a human being, be-
cause of its personal and social consequences” (cited in Di
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Tullio, 1971, p. 41), one of the most serious of which is
their aggressive acting out behavior. Aggressivity, in its de-
structive form is frequently connected with explosive im-
pulsivity. During such explosive reactions, some individuals,
unable to contain their feelings, behave in a socially unac-
ceptable way and, careless of the boundaries of good inter-
personal civilized conduct, do not weigh their thoughts or
their feelings before acting out. These antisocial behaviors
are at times observed in persons suffering from Antisocial
Personality, Passive-Aggressive, Paranoid or Borderline Per-
sonality Disorders, but they are more frequently seen in
psychopaths. Their behaviors are immature, remindful of
children who are unable to exercise their reflective capacity
and control over their impulses. As Daniel Goleman (1995)
wrote, “There is perhaps no psychological skill more fun-
damental than resisting impulse. It is the root of all emo-
tional self-control, since all emotions, by their very nature,
lead to one or another impulse to act” (p. 81). Sudden act-
ing out may signify a call for attention or acknowledgment,
or may be simple surrender to evil-doing. 
The impulsive act of psychopathic aggression is fre-
quently out of proportion to the contextual situation. It
has been proposed that at the basis of impulsive hostility
and aggressivity may be frustrated feelings of dependency,
a craving for love, a way to recapture a primitive maternal
relationship, a sense of helplessness, and a wish to control
the other (Winnicott, 1953). The negative feelings of psy-
chopaths are usually long-standing and deeply buried
within the unconscious or the subconscious. Their hostile
and aggressive feelings are ego-dystonic and they try to
control them in order to avoid real or fantasized narcissistic
injuries. In trying to maintain their psychological home-
ostasis they exercise repression but often are unable to do
so. At times, confused irrational behavior or an upsurge of
feelings of frustration precedes destructive acting-out. 
Psychopaths are “less likely to be affected by punish-
ment [which frequently produces moral socialization] and
thus are more likely to continue to engage in the punished
action in the future” (Daversa, 2010, p. 9). Psychopathy itself
predicts aggressive behavior. Lacking remorse and empathy,
and because of a tendency to uninhibited behavior, they
qualify as intraspecies predators, using aggressivity to obtain
sexual pleasure and employing power and control in crimes
that may include murder and sadistic behaviors. In their
homicidal fury or sexual orgies they are ruthless. 
Although, psychopathic aggression may be reactive, it
is more likely to be instrumental, premeditated and well
organized. The behavior is occasionally interspersed with
lack of control. Cleckley (1955) asserted that psychopathic
violence is more instrumental and is motivated by material
gain, unrestrained sexual drives, and destructive hostility,
thrill-seeking motivation, and a lack of emotional arousal.
Psychopaths are found in every social stratum, from the
lowest to the highest, and include professionals, political
leaders, and financiers. They often have a behavioral façade
of normalcy, which deceives others. They tend to downplay
their actions and exculpate themselves, minimizing their
planned violence in favor of reactive behavior. Prostitution,
drug addiction and drug-trafficking are frequently observed
in these persons, who have a strong tendency to exploit
others. 
3. Psychoanalytic Theories of Aggression
Various scholars have contributed to the understanding of
the development of human aggression. Freud, in Civilization
and Its Discontents (1961), wrote, “Men are not gentle crea-
tures who want to be loved, and who at the most can de-
fend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the
contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowment is
to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness” (p. 68).
He hypothesized that at the basis of some criminal actions
there may be a conflict at the level of the Oedipal relation-
ship. The crime could be the means to call upon oneself
punishment for the Oedipic guilt. Alexander (1948) de-
scribed psychopaths as a group of offenders who, because
of intense guilt feelings over removed early life experiences,
engage in antisocial, aggressive behavior in order to be ap-
prehended and punished.
Several theories on the psychological development of
the infant shed light on the development and understanding
of aggressive behavior. Schilder (1942) proposed that as the
child grows in the definition of his body image he becomes
more active and tries to master the world around himself.
That requires a certain amount of aggressivity, which at
times is mixed with sexuality. Eventually, however, helped
by the positive controlling influence of the family and social
mores, the child masters this aggressivity. Kohut (1971) the-
orized that a child achieves individuation and self-esteem
when he is able to tame the archaic, grandiose and exhibi-
tionistic self. Kohut believed that this is a necessary step in
order to achieve an ego-syntonic, purposeful adult person-
ality development. However, he also thought that at times,
due to a narcissistic trauma suffered in early infancy, the
child may not progress towards maturation and may still re-
tain within himself the presence of a disappointing parental
imago. At the core of his psychological self, even during his
adult life, there would then be the presence of what Kohut
refers to as an archaic transitional self-object, usually re-
quired for the maintenance of a narcissistic homeostasis.
When venting his aggression against others the psychopath
attempts to keep under control the disappointing parental
imago, which threatens his narcissistic homeostasis. 
One of the most influential object relations theorists,
Kernberg (1992) posited the idea that the infant is prewired
to form destructive schemes of himself and others. Cogni-
tive and affective potentials facilitate, he said, the relationship
of the infant with his mother. Object relations are initiated
by “a central biological function of inborn affective patterns
with their behavioral, communicative, and psychophysio-
logical manifestations” (p. 15). Kernberg postulated that the
infant’s affective memories of earlier experiences (good and
bad mother perceptions) are stored in the limbic system and
that they may be reactivated later in specific relationships. 
It is assumed that the infant has many gratifying and
concrete experiences with his mother and the environment
that will form a complex world of affective object relations
which are internalized as good-object relations. According
to Kernberg (1992), “Love and hate thus become stable in-
trapsychic structures…for organizing psychic experience
and behavioral control…through various developmental
stages” (p. 20). That gives birth to libido and aggression,
which will later become driving affects. In the normal for-
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mation of character, defenses “push the dynamic uncon-
scious deeper and deeper into the psychic apparatus” (p. 19)
contributing to the concomitant formation of ego and id.
This dynamic unconscious and its pathological primitive
complexes at times erupt into consciousness, especially in
persons with severe personality disorders, such as psycho-
pathic and borderline individuals, as well as in those with
psychoses. 
On the basis of object relations theories, it could be
claimed that the violent psychopaths, especially those that
kill, are unable to tame their archaic, grandiose, exhibition-
istic self, as Kohut (1971) and Mahler (1972) asserted. Or,
as Klein (1935) stated, their repressed bad imagoes are pro-
jected onto the outside world and their desire to destroy
them ensues; or even that, as in a narcissistic crisis, the re-
pressed pathological complexes come to the fore and in ag-
gressive acting out they destroy the frustrating object. It
could be postulated that in those moments, at the time of
the killings, these killers are victims of their pathological,
irrational unconscious. 
4. Will or Determinism: A Metaphysical Debate
The metaphysical debate regarding will and determinism
spans almost three millennia of the history of Western civi-
lization. This debate is important in the discussion of psy-
chopathic aggressivity. It follows the evolution of human
thinking from a concrete understanding of the world and
the self to the present-day highly sophisticated scientific cli-
mate. It goes from a deterministic view of the physical world
and a self under partial control by anthropomorphic gods to
the self as a free individual, master of his own destiny. 
In the beginning, humans had no concept of the self as
an agent to will, and the gods were thought to frequently
intrude into their lives, guiding their conduct. Bible narra-
tives, estimated to have been written around 3,500 years
ago, seem to testify to the Jewish belief that the god of the
Jews, Yaweh, created humans with a free will when, in Gen-
esis, it is recounted that if Adam and Eve disobeyed God’s
commands they would be punished. It seems reasonable to
interpret those words as meaning that they had a choice to
exercise their own will. In Deuteronomy the same recom-
mendation is given to Cain and the people of Israel. This
indicates that already at the time of the Biblical recounting
people believed that they possessed freedom of action and
accountability.
In Homer’s Iliad (c. 800 BCE) the many heroes often jus-
tified their deeds, both good and bad, by claiming that the
gods had intervened to influence their actions. Agamemnon,
King of Mycenae, for example, justified his abduction of Bri-
seis, Achilles beloved, by attributing his lustful action to the
gods who blinded his judgment. Both the Iliad and the
Odyssey (c. 750 BCE) portray numerous episodes in which
human behavior is portrayed as due to the interference of
the gods. Thus, there was only an appearance of freedom,
since the actions were quasi predetermined.
As early Greek philosophers began to speculate about
the origins and meanings of life, Protagoras (c. 481-420
BCE) came to believe that man is the measure of all things.
During the same period, philosophers of the atomistic
school (Leucippus [c. 480-420 BCE] and Democritus [c.
470-370 BCE]), theorized that humans, as well as the cos-
mos, are made of indivisible particles, which they called
atoms. They believed that in humans the atoms were in
continuous movement and when they collided with one
another they generated their free will. This theory, even
though deterministic when concerning cosmic events (a
concatenation of immutable repetitive events), was at the
basis of the Epicurean theory of Lucretius (94-55 BCE)
who believed that humans possess free will. Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle (4th century BCE) all believed in free will, the
first two also accepting moral determinism, since they
thought that people did not act against what they believed
to be good. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote that
“man is the origin of his actions,” (III, iii. 15, p. 139) capable
of a voluntary act following a deliberate choice. But he
added that “acts done from passion seem very far from
being done of deliberate choice” (III, ii, 6., p. 131). The Sto-
ics (early 3rd century BCE), on the other hand, including
the later Roman orator Cicero (106 BCE-43BCE) and the
Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121 CE-180 CE), be-
lieved not in free will but in strict determinism and they
claimed that this belief was supported by logic. 
Greek tragedians (e.g., Euripides, Aeschylus and Sopho-
cles) believed in free will and attempted to enlighten people
through their works to a non-deterministic view of human
behavior. They stressed human decisional capacity and per-
sonal responsibility for actions. Euripides’ Medea admits that
with her own hands she killed her children in an act of re-
venge against her unfaithful husband, disclaiming any in-
terference from the gods in her decision. Aeschylus, in his
tragedy Seven against Thebes, strongly advised that people
stop blaming the gods for their deeds and accept their re-
sponsibility, especially for their loss of moral control. The
struggle between god-driven fate and personal decision
making continued in the tragedies of Sophocles. In Oedipus
Rex, Oedipus admits that his actions were his own decision
and accepts the responsibility for them, stating that the hand
that struck his victims was his own. 
During early Christianity, two religious scholars were
prominent in the debate on free will and determinism.
Pelagius (4th cent. CE) rejected the thesis of original sin and
argued that humans had the power to choose and to decide,
and their choices would determine whether they would go
to Heaven or to Hell. During the same period, Augustine,
Bishop of Hippo, argued that humans carry the original sin
of Adam and Eve, the early transgressors of God’s com-
mands, but that through an act of grace God grants freedom
of choice to those people who are good Christians. He
maintained that God in his omniscience, even though
knowing what decisions would be made, does not interfere
with them. Later, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) made a
distinction between a natural unfree will (the acceptance of
naturally and necessarily desirable truths such as justice, and
peace) and a deliberate or free will, which helps one to eval-
uate choices before deciding. 
During the Renaissance and beyond, philosophers con-
tinued to question whether man’s actions are free or deter-
mined. Descartes (1596-1650), for example, who is famous
for his dictum Cogito ergo sum, firmly believed in human free
will. He thought it essential for the making of moral choices
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and important in assessing responsibility for a person’s ac-
tions. He thought of free will as the ability of humans to do
or not to do something without constraint, after having had
the opportunity and capacity to reflect on alternative choices
and consequences. In The Passions of the Soul he wrote, “But
the will is by its nature so free that it can never be con-
strained” (Descartes, 1999, p. 343). More pertinent to the
present discussion, he also wrote: “[By] understanding one is
enabled to entertain certain propositions, but understanding
by itself neither affirms, denies, neither chooses nor rejects.
The role is reserved for the will” (Taylor, 1972, p. 365). 
Among the humanistic scholars, Voltaire (1694-1778)
and Rousseau (1712-1778), upheld free will and the idea
that people make choices for which they assume responsi-
bility. Free will was seen as the expression of human auton-
omy and dignity of the willer. Kant (1724-1804) also
asserted in The Critique of Practical Reason (2008) that hu-
mans have free will, and he believed that their actions are
intentional and self determined. Schopenauer (1788-1860)
(2003) asserted that the will is the dominant force in a per-
son’s life. Later, James (1842-1910), arguing that humans ex-
ercise free will, rejected scientific determinism (Boas, 1972).
And in the twentieth century, Sartre (1956), strongly sup-
porting free will, contended that to deny one’s own free
will is to make excuses for one’s behavior. 
Contrary to free will, determinism is based on the belief
that any decision or action is predetermined: it is viewed as
the resultant of a concatenation of events, each caused by
the preceding one and causing the subsequent one. Among
the most famous determinists one finds the formerly-men-
tioned Stoics, who believed that every event has a cause and
the cause is rational. By the time of the late Renaissance,
Luther (1483-1546) and Calvin (1509-1564) firmly be-
lieved that man’s actions are predetermined. Spinoza (1632-
1677) asserted his belief that feelings of free will are due to
being conscious of one’s actions, but he was basically un-
aware of the concatenation of causes that determine those
actions. The French philosopher d’Holbac (1723-1789)
stated that every thought or action is determined by prior
ones and, more specifically, that man’s desires are outwardly
and inwardly motivated. 
Scholars of the compatibilistic school of philosophy
generally accepted natural causation of events but admitted
the possibility of free choice. Among the most important
scholars of compatibilism are Hobbes (1588-1679) and
Hume (1711-1776). Although upholding determinism,
Hobbes did not reject free will, believing that a voluntary
act is caused by an act of the will and is no less voluntary
because the act of will is caused. Hume believed that people
are free and responsible for exercising their free will. How-
ever, he also held a deterministic view of human actions,
because the same motives produced the same actions. Oth-
ers, such as Darwin (1809-1882), not believing in free will,
asserted that no one deserves credit for anything. 
The long debate on free will and determinism contin-
ued into the twentieth century and even quantum theory
has been used in support of free will. In that regard, Cash-
more (2010) wrote that Eccles (1989) had suggested “in the
interaction between mind and soul…[Man] achieves the
capacity to ‘swerve atoms’ – a requirement for free will (as
noted by Epicurus) by taking the ‘magic of the soul’ af-
forded by the dualism of Descartes and combining it with
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle” (p. 2)1. Frankfurt (1969;
1988) made a distinction between acting freely and having
free will, believing that although people can and do act
freely, they still do not have free will. Free will, he said, is
present only when an individual who knows that what he
wishes to do is wrong decides not to do it. It is then that
free will is exercised. A man is only free when he is able to
choose or to take the initiative to deliberate responsibly.
Other twenty-first century philosophers do not believe in
free will. Pereboom (2001) believes that people should not
be held responsible for their actions, Smilansky (2000), in a
utilitarian fashion, stated that even though there is no free
will people should not stop believing in it, because it would
destroy cardinal tenets of law, such as findings of guilt or in-
nocence and therefore annul punishment for wrong doing.
And Wilson (1998), even though admitting that there is no
certainty of its existence, wrote “[W]ithout it the mind, im-
prisoned by fatalism, would slow and deteriorate” (p. 120). 
5. Biological and Neuroimaging Findings in Psy-
chopathy
The prevalence rate of brain dysfunction in the general
population is three percent but “neuropsychological studies
show that the prevalence rate of brain dysfunction among
the criminal population is extremely high, with prevalence
rates of ninety-four percent among homicide offenders,
sixty-one percent among habitually aggressive adults, forty-
nine to seventy-eight percent among sex offenders, and sev-
enty-six percent among juvenile offenders” (Redding,
2006, p. 57), many of whom are psychopathic offenders.
From a biological point of view psychopathic aggressive
behavior is influenced by the interplay of multiple genes.
These genes, together with hormones and neurotransmit-
ters, act upon various biochemical circuits. Genetics, bio-
logical, and environmental correlates of aggressive behavior
have been pointed out by twin studies, adoption studies,
electroencephalographic studies, low arousal theory, heart
rate studies, skin conductivity tests, and gene mutations,
such as MAOA activity, testosterone and cortisol levels
(Palermo, 2010). Antisocial psychopathic aggression should
therefore be viewed as the resultant of a biological predis-
position and environmental factors and their effect on the
brain. Neuroimaging techniques give supporting objective
evidence of structural abnormalities and dysfunction of
brain regions that may contribute to mental impairment,
abnormal behavior and even criminal acting out. These fast-
evolving techniques, CAT, MRI, fMRI, sMRI, PET,
SPECT2, are continuously improving our understanding of
the neurobiology of normal and abnormal behavior. 
1 Werner Heisenberg’s principle states that it is impossible to
determine simultaneously both the position and velocity of
an electron or any other article with any great degree of ac-
curacy or certainty.
2 Computerized Axial Tomography, Magnetic Resonance Im-
aging, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, structural
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Positron Emission Tomogra-
phy, Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography
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The areas of the brain principally identified as dysfunc-
tional in the psychopath include the prefrontal cortex, tem-
poral cortex, the amygdala, the hippocampus complex, the
corpus callosum, and the angular gyrus. In addition, the
neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin are involved in
the uninhibited (impulsive) behavior of the psychopath. The
frontal inhibitory system is under the effect of serotonin. If
serotonin is deficient, dopamine takes over and increases the
tendency to immediate reward, with a lack of encoding or
moral appreciation (Palermo, 2010). 
Within the brain, there is an interplay between the pre-
frontal cortex and the amygdala. The prefrontal cortex ex-
ercises control of the amygdala, inhibiting aggressive
behavior. Aggressive behavior is often due to a hypofunc-
tion of the frontal lobe leading to hyperfunction of the
amygdala. The amygdala is an almond-shaped region of the
forebrain. It sends and receives projections from the frontal
cortex. It is involved in a variety of behaviors, such as the
reaction to facial expression, enhancing memory in emo-
tional situations, and in aggression. Hariri et al. (2002,
2005), using functional imaging techniques, “showed that
humans with a short copy of the 5-HTT [5-hydroxitrypt-
amine] allele exhibited greater amygdala neuronal activity
(i.e., in the part of the brain concerned with emotional re-
activity) to fearful visual stimuli compared with individuals
with two copies of the long allele” (in Rutter, 2005, p. 199). 
The activity of the amygdala is modulated by three spe-
cific regions of the frontal lobe: the dorso-lateral, the medial
and the orbito-frontal cortex. It plays a major role in ab-
normalities of behavior, especially when it is not controlled
by the frontal lobe. In the amygdala there are many recep-
tors for testosterone. A dysfunction of the amygdala and the
closely-related hippocampus are associated with violent ag-
gressive behavior. Fright activates the amygdala and stimu-
lates the hypothalamus, which in turn stimulates the HPA
axis [hypothalamic pituitary axis] to produce cortisol, which
contributes to aggressive acting out. The amygdala is mostly
involved in aggression, especially instrumental aggression.
Functional neuroimaging has clearly pointed out that irra-
tional aggressive behavior is often the outcome of a top-
down dysfunction of the brain in which, for example, the frontal
cortex loses its control on lower structures, such as the
amygdala. 
The insula, or Island of Reil, is found at the posterior
junction of the parietal, temporal and occipital lobes. It con-
tributes to the processing of emotional information and is
involved in the experiencing of lust, disgust, pride, humili-
ation, guilt, atonement and empathy, all of which are at
times involved in aggressive behavior. 
Lesions of the frontal lobes may lead to an incapacity to
distinguish right from wrong or to appreciate the moral im-
plications of one=s behavior and diminish its executive ca-
pacity, that is, to make choices and decide accordingly.
Lesions of the limbic system or mid-temporal regions may
predispose one, because of poor impulse control, to random
outbursts of rage and violence. Cognitive impairment and
emotional disinhibition are often present in violent criminal
psychopaths.
The behavior of the person with an aggressive antisocial
personality is remindful of the orbito-frontal syndrome: im-
pulsive, irresponsible, lacking social inhibitions, impairment
of insight and foresight. In fact, it has been suggested that a
history of head injuries, from mild to severe, is more often
reported by violent criminals than by non-violent criminals
(see e.g., Volavka, 1995). Direct damage to the frontal lobes,
however, is not necessary to produce significant frontal lobe
dysfunction. Damage to the upper brain stem may produce
similar effects (Goldberg, 2001). Raine, Meloy, Bihrle, Stod-
dard, LaCasse & Buchsbaum (1998), in a study of the brains
of convicted murderers, found PET scan abnormalities in the
prefrontal cortex, with an eleven percent reduction in the
gray matter. Patients with lesions of the temporal lobe/limbic
system may show violent repetitive behavior, with impulsiv-
ity, intense emotional arousal, and lack of control with re-
pentance and depressive feelings after their actions. 
The impulsive aggression of psychopaths and of persons
diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (which at
times coexists with psychopathy) is most probably the con-
sequence of a disruption of the emotional modulation cir-
cuits. These circuits include the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), the orbital frontal cortex (OFC), the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMC), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC) (e.g., Goodman, Triebwasser, Shah & New,
2007). Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging (sFMRI)
findings in Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and in
psychopaths show thinning of the prefrontal grey matter and
a decreased in volume of the amygdala, especially when the
level of psychopathy is high (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse,
& Colletti, 2000). One study found that fMRI showed de-
creased activity in various parts of the brain in psychopaths,
including “the amygdala, hippocampal formation, parahip-
pocampal gyrus, ventral striatum and anterior and posterior
cingulated gyrus” (Goodman et al., 2007, p. 103). 
In addition to biological and genetic explanations for
psychopathic behaviors, it has been theorized that environ-
mental and psychosocial factors may also be at the basis of
their development. Indeed, the continuous stress of mal-
treatment by caregivers, non-responsive parental attitudes,
rejection and abuse (psychological, physical or sexual) may
cause an affective disregulation. This disregulation in medi-
ated by a hormonal cascade, enhanced by monoamine ox-
idase A genotype involving the brain, especially the
functions of the amygdala and hypothalamus (Caspi et. al,
2002). The affective neural network disregulation in the
growing child over time will produce typical psychopathic
behaviors, such as a lack of affective responsivity or distant
or arrogant and antisocial interpersonal relationships (Dav-
ersa, 2010). 
6. The Libet Experiment
In 1965 researchers in Germany, using human EEG trac-
ings, reported that just before (0.4-4 seconds) consciously
initiating a voluntary movement of the hand or foot the
electrical pattern of brain activity of the participants in their
study shifted (Kornhuber, & Deecke, 1965). They termed
the shift readiness potential (Bereitschaftspotential), believing
that it was related to the process of preparing the body to
make the movement. Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl
(1983) replicated the experiment, employing neuroimaging
to pinpoint the exact moment when the subject became
consciously aware of his intention to act. They were able to
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demonstrate that the readiness potential began 550 millisec-
onds before the muscles were activated to perform the act.
However, the readiness potential was not always followed
by movement. They noted that “[t]he brain was evidently
beginning the volitional process of the act well before the
activation of the muscle that produced movement” (p. 49).
In addition, they wrote, the muscle activation took place
after too long a time to assume that it was due to a motor
command to the muscle. The study confirmed that individ-
uals became aware of their desire to move the hand 350
milliseconds before the readiness potential unconsciously
took place but 200 milliseconds before the motor act itself.
The above experiments support the idea that the un-
conscious readiness potential takes place before individuals
are aware of having the will to act. That would be contrary
to the assumption that their free will initiated the action,
because the action apparently started in the brain 350 mil-
liseconds before the act, and 200 milliseconds before the
subjects’ awareness. Libet et al. (1983) theorized that al-
though the will does not initiate the action it may exercise
a veto of the entire process if the subjects do not wish to
continue a specific action. As Schwartz and Begley (2003)
wrote, Libet had noted that the veto of an urge to act is a
common experience. Therefore, even though the urge to
move the hand is unconsciously initiated, the will is still in
control and carries on the act in the way the individual de-
cided. In other words, they note, refraining from acting is
as much of an act as committing one, as Sherrington (1933)
had written decades earlier. 
Libet et al.’s (1983) findings support the idea that free will
does not initiate a voluntary act but allows it or suppresses it
because of the specific desire of the subject or because of its
socially unacceptable consequences. He clearly stated that
the volitional process is initiated unconsciously, but added
that free will is not excluded because it can veto the act. That
is, the final decision to carry out an act is consciously con-
trolled and the unconscious initiative for an action may ei-
ther proceed or may be aborted by the veto of the free will
which, in that case, acts as a gatekeeper or censor; that is, the
veto capacity is not the result of a preceding unconscious
process. However, what is necessary for gatekeeping is atten-
tion (will) – a mental force that actively engages the wisdom
of the executive discrimination of the prefrontal cortex.
Schwartz and Begley (2003) commented that the will acting
as a gatekeeper has long been present in religious and ethical
dicta as Do not do that, or Control thyself. 
Libet later wrote (1999), “Given the speculative nature
of both determinism and non-determinist theories, why
not adapt the view that we do have a free will (until some
real contradictory evidence may appear, if it ever does).
Such a view would at least allow us to proceed in a way
that accepts and accommodates our own deep feelings that
we do have free will” (p. 56). In this way man would not
view himself as an automaton. 
It has been asserted that advances in neuroscience will
not undermine our intuitive notions of free will and moral
responsibility. Thus far, wrote Roskies (2006) they have not
established whether we live in a determinate world but have
brought into the debate random or probabilistic processes.
Further, she wrote that “[d]eterminism is an assumption that
many scientists adhere to, but it is likely always to remain
an assumption” (p. 421). Assumptions are, obviously, not
facts. The same cannot be said of biological mechanisms and
their effects on humans as responsible agents. Studies have
shown that volitional activity activates the prefrontal cortex,
just as automatic clenching of the hands activates the motor
cortex. It can be safely said that the dorsolateral prefrontal
region has as a primary role in the free selection of behav-
ior, “choosing from a number of possible actions by inhibit-
ing all but one and focusing the attention on the chosen
one” (Schwartz & Begley, 2003, p. 312.). If lesions are pres-
ent in those areas of the brain, they make the subject similar
to an automaton, diminishing spontaneous activity and se-
lective attention. It is to be hoped that more extensive
knowledge of neuroscience will facilitate the shaping of
views on responsibility, reconciling intuitive and legal no-
tions within the framework of a compatibilistic view of
brain and mind working together. As Kawohl and Haber-
mayer (2007), reacting to Libet’s paper, suggested, in dealing
with offenders, psychoforensic experts should use a psy-
chopathological approach based on cognition, motivation,
personality and personality values rather than the data from
Libet’s experiments. 
7. Free Will, Decisional Capacity and Criminal 
Responsibility
The concept of free will in criminal responsibility and mens
rea, introduced into the legal system in England around the
eleventh century, was emphasized in the following centuries
by various scholars, including de Bracton (13th century),
Hale (17th century) and Blackstone (18th century). For any
decision to be free an adult individual must be aware of his
surroundings (the reality around him), of his own and
other’s behavior, and of the consequences of his actions or
non-actions. Further, he must have the cognitive capacity
to be able to make choices in conformity to the laws, ethics,
and moral and social standards of the society in which he
lives, and to recognize the social value of the acts he is per-
forming. 
Cognitive capacity is understood as the capacity to assess
one’s own actions. This capacity may be impaired because
of damage to particular brain areas, usually involving the
frontal and prefrontal regions of the brain, the seats of cog-
nitive processing that can signal and trigger prepackaged
emotional reactions. Cognition facilitates the presence of
emotions by “giving us the ability to make decisions about
what kind of action should occur next, given the situation
in which we find ourselves now.…[and] it allows this shift
from reaction to action” (Le Doux, 1996, p. 175). Integrat-
ing cognitive capacity, decisional – or volitional – ccapacity,
is the ability to reach a free and voluntary intent to act out
what one chooses. It includes a deliberating process that re-
quires prior reflection and the choice of a given course of
action, which may or may not be executed. In forensics free
decisional capacity determines responsibility.
There are mental disorders in which the decisional ca-
pacity is clearly involved. These include the obsessive-com-
pulsive neurosis, in which the compulsion to act does not
allow reflection before acting or obsessive thinking does not
allow deliberation; the disinhibited behaviors of the psy-
chopath who acts out in an impulsive manner, without
prior reflection; or the disinhibited, unreflected decision
making of persons under the effects of alcohol or drugs. At
times, inner suspiciousness in persons with severe person-
ality disorders may cause a misinterpretation of facts that
contributes to impairment in decision making. People with
schizoid and schizotypal personalities who are severely
withdrawn may also show decisional impairment, not being
totally aware of the many facets of a social situation. This
becomes more evident when they are under stress. Cogni-
tive and decision-making capacities (understanding and
will) normally integrate each other. However, they are fre-
quently impaired in people who are psychotic, disrupting
their capacity for clear reasoning and choice. 
In one of the most well-known criminal cases of the
twentieth century the defense attorney pointed out the
presence of many factors, known and unknown, that may
undermine an individual’s cognition and decisional capac-
ities. His voice echoed in the courtroom as he asked why
the defendants had attacked their victim. The answer, he
said, “was self-explanatory, not for money, not out of spite,
not for hate. They killed him as they might kill a spider, a
fly, for the experience. They killed him because they were
made that way. Because somewhere in the infinite processes
that go to the making up of the boy or the man, something
slipped” (Famous American Trials, 2010). Those were the
words of Clarence Darrow and his main argument in his
defense of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, both
teenagers, who killed 14-year-old Bobby Franks. In his final
closing statement Darrow claimed that the two defendants
were not fully responsible for their act. Their behavior, he
asserted, might have been the consequence of peculiar and
immature thinking, possibly due to psychological, biological
or genetic factors. His defense was upholding determinism
in a court of law and it was his belief that the future would
support his assertion. He shifted the debate of will and de-
terminism from the metaphysical arena to the
scientific/forensic one. Darrow was anticipating what 80
years later is taking place: the contributions of neuropsy-
chological assessments and neuroimaging technology to
forensics and to findings of legal accountability. 
Legal accountability theory attempts to determine
whether the individual/agent has mens rea – the capacity to
form intent and the mental capability of controlling his own
actions: the actor should have the capacity to act differently
on the basis of a selection of choices. Accountability theory
views the miscreant as responsible for his actions unless his
mental state at the time of a crime made him unable to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness, the quality, or the consequences
of his actions, and to behave according to the dictates of
the law (American Law Institute Model Penal Code) – in
other words, to be in control of his volitional capacity. The
presumption of free will underlies all tests for criminal re-
sponsibility: are criminal actions the result of the exercise
of free will or the consequence of deterministic factors?
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) wrote, “The recurrent theme
for the concept of responsibility…is behavior freely and in-
tentionally engaged in” (p. 504). 
Determinism, as described previously, means that be-
havior is due to a concatenation of causes, and as Juth and
Lorentzon wrote, “Everything that happens is taken to be
sufficiently determined by prior states, hence there could
never have been any real attenuations to what actually hap-
pened” (2010, p. 2). On the basis of pure (hard) determin-
ism, psychopaths would not be responsible for aggressive
behavior because they did not exercise free will. However,
present-day forensic legislation reflects the largely accepted
assumption that “people have a relatively unhindered ca-
pacity to make choices and to decide what they will do”
(Felthous, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, in addition to cognition, the
1962 American Law Institute Model Penal Code for the
insanity defense stressed volitional capacity. 
Juth and Lorentzon (2010), avoiding involvement in a
metaphysical dispute on free will and determinism, suggest
substituting free will with gradual autonomy, making ac-
countability a matter of degree. They explain that the in-
terplay of will, decision and action, which are part of the
autonomous self, would stress “responsibility and account-
ability in terms of control and control in terms of a con-
ception of autonomy” (p. 5). Their concept of autonomy is
remindful of Bandura’s (2006) view of people as a human
agency with the unique capacity to mold their life circum-
stances and the course that their life takes. This idea also is
stressed by Felthous (2008) who stated that people are
agents with a locus of control and that in spite of “the con-
catenation of natural causes for decision and action…must
be treated as individuals…” (p. 9). People possess a will, he
added, that allows them to exercise necessary control of de-
cisions and actions in their social life, which enables society
to function. 
Legal scholar Morse (2007) argued that free will is not
a necessary part of the assessment of criminal responsibility,
because the test required by the courts is a rationality test.
The rationality test is basic to the assessment of competency
to stand trial, but a complete assessment of criminal respon-
sibility includes the will (or decisional capacity), necessary
in deliberating and acting upon a specific intent. An indi-
vidual’s will includes the following faculties: to control, to
choose, to decide, to have knowledge of consequences, to
be accountable for actions. It is necessary for rational inter-
action with others and the environment. The thinking of
psychopaths is frequently irrational at a deeper level, so
much so that their cognitive capacity is often impaired. As
Schneider and Nussbaum (2007) stated, they have difficulty
in “processing and responding appropriately to the emo-
tional and moral dimensions of a situation” (p. 167), and
they show deficits in the cognitive and emotional spheres.
Some legal scholars question the rationality test that
Morse stated is at the basis of the legal system approach to
criminal responsibility. Felthous (2009) seems to disagree
with a pure rationality principle, writing that “[t]he law’s
approach to mental criminal responsibility…can best be de-
scribed as normative functionalism on the basis of presence
or absence of certain capacities or functional abilities or by
the specific actual, active functions such as specific intent
and deliberation” (p. 8). Those normative functions impor-
tant for a finding of criminal responsibility are functional
parts of the will: consciousness, self control, rationality, in-
tentionality, choice and deliberation. 
Cognitive and volitional factors, essential in the deter-
mination of free will and necessary for normal human in-
teractions, are basic in the assessment of psychopathic
offenders’ legal responsibility for criminal acts. When those
assessments conclude that offenders are legally insane the
findings should be based on the fact that they have been
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found to be suffering from impairment of those factors.
To this effect Buchanan (2008), wrote, “Criminal respon-
sibility requires, broadly speaking, the same kind of mental
[cognitive] abilities that are required before someone can
validly enter into a contract or make a will…[so] we want
people to have been making a proper choice to act as they
did before we hold them responsible, or, at least, fully re-
sponsible” (p. 26). 
The aggressive behavior of psychopaths is central to a
discussion of their criminal responsibility. As discussed
throughout this chapter, they show poor control of their
aggressive instincts. Their aggression is mostly instrumental
and goal directed (Blair, 2001) and “[t]hey show severe dif-
ficulties in aversive conditioning and instrumental learn-
ing….[and] in processing the fearfulness and sadness of
others (Blair, 2003, p. 5.) Their aggressivity and degree of
psychopathy is supported by various studies showing
changes in some brain structures and functions (e.g., Kiehl
et al., 2001; Raine et al., 2000; Tiihonen et al. (2000). Con-
sideration of biological correlates and neuroimaging find-
ings are important in the assessment of criminal
responsibility and when used in the forensic assessment they
bring a paradigm shift from a neurophilosophical perspec-
tive to a brain-behavior one (Witzel, Walter, Bogerts,
Northoff, 2008). It is probable that in the future they will
become ever more helpful, as for example, DNA has been
in determining criminal responsibility, and even at present
they should be an essential adjunct in the clinical decision
making used to assess responsibility, responsibility that ulti-
mately should be based on a free and voluntary act. But the
workings of the human mind are more complex and com-
plicated than is revealed by new technologies. In view of
the gross impact that neuroscience seems to have on crim-
inal law at present one should opt for prudence in its ap-
plication. The self cannot be totally described on the basis
of technology and behavior is not limited to states of the
brain, isolated from the world. Mental states are a dynamic
process dealing with beliefs and desires. In the process the
volitional activity the individual self is moved by intentions
and emotions.
Conclusion
Although it is commonly accepted that the universe obeys
natural laws, humans have intuitive feelings that they are
endowed with the capacity to freely choose what they want
to do and whether they want to control their actions. Com-
patibilistic theorists believe that human beings, even though
partially subjected to determinism in their behaviors, are
still able to make free and conscious decisions. According
to the explanations of Libet (1999; 1983), they are able to
make a conscious decision to veto (or not veto) whatever
their unconscious had prepared them to decide or to will.
“The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to ini-
tiate a voluntary act, but rather to control whether the act
takes place” (Libet, 1999, p. 54). It is an act of selection by
the conscious will and decision about which one of the un-
conscious initiatives should be vetoed or should go forward
to action. 
This is not unusual for the workings of the mind; the
unconscious generally does the ground work for the con-
scious. The conscious ego frequently only decides or wills
behavior. Without the unconscious, the conscious mind
would be a chaotic arena, inundated by numerous inform-
ative facts, requirements or rearrangements, and the self
could not function. That is why the unconscious is also im-
portant. It is where the brain stores and uses information
and prepares solutions for the signature of the self and
where much thinking is done. 
Psychopaths, in their life course and specifically in their
aggressive behavior, are certainly under the effect of ge-
netic-biological factors and environmental stimuli and they
seemingly lack control and are prey to impulsivity, even
though their aggression is generally considered instrumen-
tal. They place themselves above the laws of society, possibly
due to inner feelings of inadequacy and previous rejection.
They basically know, but obviously disregard, the entity,
quality and consequences of their actions. Even though he
had deep psychiatric problems, Jeffrey Dahmer, the serial
killer, was the epitome of the above (Palermo, 2004).
In summary, psychopathic criminal behavior is not only
due to a personal decision to act (or a decision not to act)
but also to predisposing factors – biological, genetic and en-
vironmental. Therefore, their aggressive behavior should be
viewed within a compatibilistic theoretical approach (the
coexistence of free will and determinism) and, if found
guilty, the question of diminished responsibility should be
considered before deciding their punishment.
Punishment should be, ideally, proportionate to the
crime committed. In the utilitarian theory punishment is
right if it produces a positive outcome (Bentham, 1830). Its
purpose should be to make offenders reflect that what they
did was wrong or is considered wrong, is not to be repeated,
and obviously to be corrected in any future behavior. Kant
([1797] 1985), the most famous proponent of retributive
punishment, believed that punishing offenders is a “must”
and that not to punish them is morally wrong. Society,
however, argues Grachek (2006), should not punish those
who cannot profit from it, such as the mentally ill who, in
spite of punishment, continue to be unable to conform
their conduct to the law, in which case it would serve no
purpose. Indeed, even though retribution has beneficial ef-
fects for some, psychopathic offenders, though deserving
punishment for their criminal acts, need a different, perhaps
more lenient, kind of punishment than criminals found to
be legally sane, one that takes into consideration the unique
factors that contributed to their criminal misconduct. 
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